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ABSTRACT
If even a fraction of the predictions about nanotechnology are
realized, our society will be a dramatically different and better
place than it is today. Yet, due to the infancy of the field, it is still
unclear how traditional patent doctrine will be applied to
nanotechnology. As it stands, the creators of nanoscale versions of
traditional products might face infringement claims from
traditional patent holders. The reverse doctrine of equivalents
serves as a possible mechanism to equitably excuse the literal
infringement of traditional patents by nanotech inventors in a way
that encourages the progress of science.

INTRODUCTION
The promises of nanotechnology2 are legion. At the most radical,
futurists envision nanoscale assemblers with the capability to build even the
most complex products from the bottom up, one atom at a time.3 Others
envision that nanotechnology will enable drug delivery systems that can
administer medicine locally.4 While advances of this magnitude currently
exist only in creative imaginations, there have already been dramatic
advances in manipulating matter at nanometer dimensions, and ambitious
researchers are already exploring the possibility of nanocomputing.5
¶1
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The best working definition of nanotechnology uses size as its defining
feature. The nanoscale is roughly between 1 and 100 nanometers, or 1 to 100
billionths of a meter. SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS OF NANOSCIENCE AND
NANOTECHNOLOGY 1 (M.C. Roco and W.S. Bainbridge, eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Societal Implications].
3
George M. Whitesides, The Once and Future Nanomachine, SCI. AM., Sept.
16, 2001, at 78.
4
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5
E.g., Ron Dagani, Building from the Bottom Up, CHEM. AND ENG’G NEWS,
Oct. 16, 2000, at 27.
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However, commercialization of nanotech products so far has been
modest, focused on enhancing traditional products such as stain-resistant
pants and transparent sunscreen.6 Yet even this limited commercialization
is creating a stir on Wall Street.7 Indeed, the National Science Foundation
estimates that nanotechnology will grow to a $1 trillion industry in 10 to 15
years,8 and the government has earmarked approximately $3.7 billion for
research and development.9
¶2

¶3
Given what is at stake and the high expectations put on the
burgeoning industry, it is imperative for current patent doctrine to
effectively respond to this new technology. At one level, it is particularly
fortunate that the nanotechnology revolution is still some years in the
offing, giving scholars the time to discuss the issues thoroughly.
¶4
In order to obtain a patent, certain statutory requirements must be
satisfied; the invention must be novel, nonobvious and useful.10 While
nanotechnology falls squarely within the traditional doctrines of patent law
in many respects,11 it also raises unique questions.12 For example, can a
miniature replica of a traditional product satisfy the nonobvious requirement
for patentable subject matter?13 It is well settled that pure miniaturizations
are obvious in light of prior art,14 but it is an open question whether
nanoscale miniaturizations will clear the nonobviousness hurdle by virtue of
the fundamentally different laws of physics at play at such small
dimensions.15
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Justin Gillis and Jonathan Krim, If It’s Nano, It’s BIG, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
2004, at F01.
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SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 3-4.
9
21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, Pub. L. No.
108-153 (S. 189), § 1-5 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7501—05) (the § 5
appropriations add up to slightly under $3.7 billion).
10
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101—03 (2000).
11
Barry Newberger, Intellectual Property and Nanotechnology, 11 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 649, 654 (2003).
12
See Michael P. Williams, Questions about Patents and Nanotechnology,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 2003, at t7 (discussing practical intellectual property issues
in nanotechnology today); see also Frederick A. Fielder & Glenn H. Reynolds,
Legal Problems of Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
593 (1994) (discussing more abstract aspects of intellectual property in
nanotechnology).
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Nanotech inventors also face uncertainty about the extent of their
patent rights given the patent rights of inventors of traditional products.16
Patents with broad claims, that lack reference to scale, on traditional
products might allow traditional patent holders to exact royalties from their
nanoscale counterparts.17 Furthermore, bargaining between the traditional
and nanoscale manufacturers might break down because of the diverging
valuations that the parties place on their assets.18 Parties might value their
contributions inaccurately because of the uncertainties inherent in
developing new technology.19
¶5

¶6
This iBrief examines the reverse doctrine of equivalents and
concludes that it can be used to cure this infirmity.20 At its most vigorous,
the doctrine can cure an impasse between bargaining parties in individual
cases by entirely excusing literal infringement.21 Still, in a more limited
sense, the mere existence of the reverse doctrine of equivalents can improve
the bargaining position of nanotech inventors.22 Favoring nanotech
inventors is desirable because it encourages the progress of science and
hastens the commercialization of nanotechnology research, especially in a
situation where the harm to traditional manufacturers is minimal.

I. THE REVERSE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
¶7
A “wholesome realism” drives the doctrine of equivalents,
compelling a finding of infringement even though the accused device
escapes infringement literally but still performs substantially the same
function, in substantially the same way, with substantially the same purpose
as the claimed subject matter.23 The doctrine of equivalents is a doubleedged sword because that realism also compels the equitable excuse of
literal infringement in a certain subset of situations.24 A clear formulation
of the reverse doctrine of equivalents was given by Justice Jackson in
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.:25

16
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Id.
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Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 89 (1994).
19
See id. at 84-89 (describing examples of bargaining breakdowns during the
development of new technology).
20
Id. at 91.
21
See id.
22
See id. at 97.
23
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
24
Id.
25
339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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[W]here a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article
that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially
different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the
claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and
defeat the patentee's action for infringement.26
In effect, when an accused device is so different from the claimed invention, a
ruling of noninfringement may be justified even though the accused device falls
squarely within the claims.27 Indeed, some have suggested that the reverse
doctrine of equivalents is more aptly termed the “doctrine of
nonequivalence”.28

In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,29 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit articulated the rule with greater
specificity.30 In order for a defendant to prevail, two requirements must be
satisfied.31 First, the accused infringer must have literally infringed the
accuser’s patent claims.32 Literal infringement occurs when the language of
the claim, “reads directly, unequivocally, and word-for-word” on the
accused device.33 In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court called literal
infringement a “dull and very rare type of infringement,”34 however in
practice, literal infringement occurs often due to uncertainty about the scope
of the claim language.35
¶8

Second, in order to avoid infringement, the accused device must be
“sufficiently different” from the accuser’s device.36
Like the
straightforward application of the doctrine of equivalents, the standard of
nonequivalence is also a factual inquiry.37 While rare, instances of
nonequivalence have occurred.38 In Leesonia Corp. v. United States,39 the
court held that the defendant’s battery did not infringe the plaintiff’s patent
¶9
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Id at 608-09.
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(Fed. Cir. 1988).
29
846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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Id. at 1371.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, at 1118 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
34
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
35
MUELLER supra note 27, at 238.
36
Texas Instruments, 846 F.2d, at 1371.
37
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 346 (6th ed.,
2003). But see Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760,771 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (treating reverse doctrine of equivalents as a legal issue).
38
CHISUM ON PATENTS §18.04[4][c] (2004).
39
530 F.2d 896, 905-06 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
27
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on an electrode structure because it had “nothing of a similar nature,” even
though the defendant’s battery fell within the properly construed scope of
the plaintiff’s claims.40 Similarly in Gardner v. Ford Motor Co.,41
infringement was excused because the accused subject matter was far
removed from the “principle, structure and operation” of the claimed
subject matter.42
¶10
The reasoning behind Precision Metal Fabricators Inc. v. Jetstream
Systems Co.43 is also telling. Like Gardner, the finding of nonequivalence
was grounded on the fact that both inventions had different principles of
operation.44 Yet importantly, the court also indicated that the presence of
incidental similarities that failed to enhance the defendant’s machine at the
expense of the plaintiff militated against a finding of infringement.45
¶11
Nanotechnology fits snugly within this general emphasis on
principles of operation and incidental similarities. Nanomachines work on
entirely different principles of operation than traditional machines. Indeed,
nanomachines must contend with entirely different laws of physics. While
the argument for incidental similarity is slightly weaker because the general
design of nanomachines might bear some similarity to their traditional
counterparts at an abstract level, an incidental similarity argument is still
strong because of the vast disparity of scales, the additional technical
considerations of working at a nanoscale, and the unlikelihood of
competition between nanomanufacturers and traditional manufacturers.

Even so, it cannot be overlooked that the overwhelming majority of
courts acknowledge the existence of the reverse doctrine of equivalents but
find it inapplicable to the cases before them.46 Understandably, the subset
of cases where the accused device can both satisfy the literal infringement
test and still be sufficiently different from the accuser’s device is narrow.47
Furthermore, an accused infringer cannot successfully invoke the reverse
doctrine of equivalents by merely claiming that their product is superior.48
¶12

40

Id. at 905-06.
17 USPQ2d 1177, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 1990)
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Id. at 1186.
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693 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Calif. 1988)
44
See id. at 819.
45
See id.
46
CHISUM, supra note 38, at §18.04[4][c].
47
See HARMON, supra note 37, at 345.
48
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 724, 728
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“That Dat’s catalysts may be superior to those actually
invented, disclosed, and contemplated by Ziegler et al. would not by itself
remove Dart’s catalysts from the scope of claims 1 and 4”).
41
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Indeed, the most likely scenario is simply that the accused infringer has
merely developed the same device.49
Moreover, a recent court ruling has cast serious doubt on the fate of
the reverse doctrine of equivalents. In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface
Architectural Res., Inc.,50 the Federal Circuit explained that it is disinclined
to apply the reverse doctrine because the disclosure requirements enacted
after Graver Tank are coterminous with the broadest reaches of the reverse
doctrine.51 In other words, properly construed claims of a traditional
product should be specific enough that it should not read on the
nanoproduct in the first instance. Insofar as this is the case, it is good news
for nanotechnologists hoping to protect their work with confidence; either
way their products will be held as noninfringing. However, it is difficult to
understand how a court could possibly construe traditional dimensions as
part of claims that have a specification entirely devoid of any mention of
scale. It is unlikely that the specification and claims of a traditional product
will mention scale at all since before nanotechnology scale was a non-issue.
Another reason why claims are rarely limited to scale is the rational fear of
needlessly limiting the scope of the claims.
¶13

In any event, since it is uncertain how infringement suits of this ilk
will play out in the courts, the prudent move is to explore all alternatives,
including the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Despite the Federal Circuit’s
critical stance on the reverse doctrine of equivalents, it is still good law.52
And despite the Federal Circuit’s serious doubts, it is still possible to see
how a nanotechnology improver of a traditional product could cogently
craft a defense by using the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
¶14

¶15
For a nanoimprover to successfully employ the reverse doctrine of
equivalents she would have to pass the two-pronged test that Judge
Newman set forth in Texas Instruments.53 First, it is possible to imagine a
scenario where a nanoproduct literally infringes a traditional product. For a
simplified illustration, consider the development of a playable nanoguitar by
researchers at Cornell University.54 A “guitarist” uses a laser to pluck
strings 100 atoms wide to produce notes 17 octaves higher than normal

49

See HARMON, supra note 37, at 345.
279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
51
Id.
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See Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1575, 1657-58 (2003).
53
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
54
George Johnson, Ideas & Trends: Atomic Scales; Striking Notes of Progress
on the World’s Tiniest Guitar, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, Late Edition – Final,
at § 4, p. 12.
50
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human hearing.55 Still, imagine an extremely broad patent on a traditional
guitar without reference to scale that claims broadly a six-stringed
instrument. In theory, the plaintiff might be able to prove that the claimed
invention reads on the nanoguitar.
¶16
Second, the accused infringer would have the burden of showing
that its product is sufficiently different from the claimed subject matter such
that the reverse doctrine of equivalence applies. The nanotechnologist
could make a strong argument that there are sufficient differences by
pointing to the unique behavior of matter at such a small scale. The
nanomachinist must take into account drastically different considerations
during the design process compared to what a traditional machinist need
consider. For example, smaller than a critical size, “the electron structure,
conductivity, reactivity, melting temperature, and mechanical properties”
are all different than the macroscale equivalent.56 At the same time,
nanoscale interactions start to be dominated by quantum mechanics.57 The
leading report on the societal implications of nanotechnology by the
National Science Foundation has gone so far as to say that, “[t]he nanoscale
is not just another step toward miniaturization, but a qualitatively different
scale.”58

Of course, the example posed by the nanoguitar is perhaps too
simple. Due to the proliferation of increasingly specific patent rights (in
other words, the development of a patent thicket, in the field of, for
example, guitars), it is unlikely that there exist patents broad enough to
cover the still rudimentary advances of nanotechnology. However, it does
not take much imagination to realize that this situation will loom large when
nanotechnologists begin to develop mechanical parts with increasing
specialization. When that day comes, as a legal matter, the reverse doctrine
of equivalents should be available to nanodevelopers.
¶17

II. APPLICATION OF THE REVERSE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS CAN
CURE BARGAINING BREAKDOWNS
¶18
Strong intellectual property rights are desirable in fields of
developing technologies because early protection provides an incentive for
initial development. 59 Early protection also provides the innovator the

55

Id.
CHARLES P. POOLE, JR. & FRANK J. OWENS, INTRODUCTION TO
NANOTECHNOLOGY xi (2003).
57
SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 1.
58
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59
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1040-44 (1989) (presenting a
general summary of the Kitchean Prospect Theory).
56
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means for efficient coordination of subsequent development.60 A strong
patent portfolio is integral to start-up companies hoping to attract venture
capital.61 Solid intellectual property is even more critical in light of venture
capital’s current skepticism of nanotechnology start-ups.62 Indeed, many
nanotechnologists are already seeking patent protection: one estimate
places the number of patents on nanotechnology between 1996 and 2004 at
over 3,000,63 and that number is only expected to grow.64
¶19
Blocking patents can occur when an inventor obtains a broad patent
on a pioneering product and then another inventor subsequently patents a
radical improvement on the original device.65 The claims of the first
“pioneering” patent may read on the subsequently patented developments of
the improver.66 When this occurs, the improver can exclude, or block, the
pioneer from practicing the improvement, but at the same time, the pioneer
can in turn block the improver from practicing the improvement itself.67
Traditionally, the way to break this stalemate is through cross-licensing.68
In other words, a bargain will be struck between pioneers and improvers.69

However, breakdowns in the bargaining process do occur.70
According to Professor Robert Merges, breakdowns are more likely to
occur when parties hold diverging valuations of the products.71 Pioneering
patent holders might overvalue their product, knowing that they are in the
superior bargaining position.72 On the other hand, improvers might
overvalue their product because of the inherent uncertainty that arises from
technological change.73 More generally, “attribution bias” is a well-studied
¶20

60

Id.
Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 N.W. U.L. REV
1495, 1505-06 (2001).
62
See Gillis and Krim, supra note 6 (noting that venture capitalists, burned by
the dot com bubble, are thinking twice before investing in nanotechnology).
63
See Williams, supra note 12, at t7.
64
Lance D. Reich, Protecting Tiny Gizmos: The Patent and Trademark Office is
Preparing for Nanotech Applications, 26 NAT’L L. J., Jan. 26. 2004, No. 22, at
S1.
65
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 114 (Robert P.
Merges, Peter S. Mennell & Mark A. Lemley, eds., Aspen Publishers, 2003).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
MUELLER, supra note 27, at 368.
69
Merges, supra note 18, at 78.
70
Id. at 84.
71
Id. at 89.
72
While the pioneer may be excluded from practicing the improvement, the
pioneer can exclude the improver from practicing their entire invention. Id. at
82.
73
See id. at 84-89.
61
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phenomenon where individual contributors value their contribution more
highly than their opponent’s contribution when they are engaged in a
competitive setting.74 Incorrect assessments complicate bargaining because
the other party must determine whether the assessment was made in good
faith or was a part of a bargaining strategy.75
¶21
Even though it is rarely invoked, the reverse doctrine of equivalents
remains a favorite among scholars.76 Professor Merges argues that
employing the reverse doctrine of equivalents is one way to break the
bargaining stalemate.77 Merges notes that while the reverse doctrine of
equivalents is applied infrequently, the threat alone can force pioneers to
lower their terms.78 In other words, the pioneer is willing to accept less
money from the licensee because of the threat, albeit small, that the court
will apply the doctrine.79

Indeed, the problem at issue here, the possibility of a bargaining
breakdown between pioneers working on a traditional scale and nanoscale
improvers, is one that is amenable to the reverse doctrine of equivalents
release valve. Dan Burk and Mark Lemley write, “[t]he doctrine can apply
to radical improvements in any area of technology, and it has indeed been
used to cover technological paradigm shifts within an industry.”80 They
explain that the reverse doctrine of equivalents is better suited for industries
where radical changes predominate over incremental ones.81 The traditional
computer software industry is a field where changes occur incrementally
and consequently the reverse doctrine of equivalents would not be a good
fit.82 However, nanotechnology represents a drastic paradigm shift from
traditional manufacturing because of the different physical laws applicable
to nanoscale dimensions. Insofar as nanoscale improvers must face unique
challenges in the development of their inventions, nanotechnology presents
a prime candidate for successful implementation of the doctrine.
¶22

At the other side of the table, the bargaining position of the
nanotechnologist is improved under this regime. Furthermore, the extent of
the improvement is modified by the frequency that the courts invoke the
doctrine.83 The more frequently it is used to excuse infringement, the better
¶23

74

Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 701 (1998).
75
Merges, supra note 18, at 90.
76
MUELLER, supra note 27, at 245-46.
77
Merges, supra note 18, at 91.
78
Id. at 97.
79
Id.
80
Burk and Lemley, supra note 52, at 1657.
81
Id. at 1658.
82
Id.
83
See Merges, supra note 18, at 95.
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the bargaining position of the improver becomes.84 As it stands, the
likelihood of a successful defense based on the reverse doctrine of
equivalents is low.85 However, by using the reverse doctrine of equivalents
more liberally in specific cases, courts can incrementally improve the
bargaining positions of all nanotechnology actors.
¶24
Some might argue that the intellectual property rights of
nanoimprovers are strengthened at the expense of the intellectual property
rights of traditional manufacturers.
Why shouldn’t traditional
manufacturers reap the rewards of nanotechnology as well? After all, on
some level aren’t the traditional manufacturers the ones ultimately
responsible for the creation of the machinery in the first place? There are
three responses to these compelling points. First, manufacturers of
traditional products are not likely to be in the best position to take
advantage of the nanotechnological applications of their products. The
adaptation of traditional products to the nanoscale is likely to involve
nontrivial costs in obtaining the relevant expertise and upgrading
machinery. Nimble nanotechnology companies, already outfitted with the
necessary technical expertise, are the logical developers of the new
technology.

Second, it is not clear that nanoscale miniaturizations will adversely
affect the commercial sales of traditional manufacturers. Nanoguitars will
never compete with traditional ones. As long as humans remain on a
traditional scale, there will always be a demand for products that can be
easily manipulated. Thus, traditional manufacturers need not fear that their
sales will be decimated because the vastly smaller products will fill a unique
commercial niche.
¶25

¶26
A third reason why traditional manufacturers should not be granted
a monopoly over their nanotechnological counterparts is that granting such
a monopoly does not promote an underlying function of the patent system.
Courts and commentators have recognized that patents promote scientific
progress through providing inventors with an incentive to invent.86 In this
case, traditional manufacturers never contemplated nanoapplications and
never needed such prospects as incentives to invent the traditional products
that they invented. Thus, as motivations stand today, awarding a traditional
manufacturer with a monopoly would confer a windfall on the traditional
manufacturer.

84

Id.
See CHISUM, supra note 38, at §18.04[4][c].
86
See Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 34-35.
85
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CONCLUSION
¶27
By all indications, the development, let alone commercialization, of
nanomachines is still years in the making.87 Yet, considering the concerted
efforts and progress towards the rudimentary technology necessary to build
nanomachines, it is only a matter of time before the dreams of
nanoengineers become a reality. Hopefully, the delayed arrival of the
nanotechnology revolution will allow a thoughtful and thorough debate
about the application of patent doctrine to this new field. There are many
indications that scholars have already begun to engage in this debate.
¶28
It is likely that manufacturers patented traditional products by using
claims that lack limitations on scale. These claims might encompass the
miniaturizing work of nanotechnologists even though those nanoscale
counterparts are substantially different than the traditional products by
virtue of the drastically different physical properties of matter at such small
sizes. When this is the case, the reverse doctrine of equivalents should be
available to nanotechnologists to excuse literal infringement. At the very
least, it is imperative that the reverse doctrine of equivalents remain good
law even if the courts still decline to apply it in most cases, since even its
threat influences bargaining between rational actors in a way that favors the
progress of science and the commercialization of its fruits.

87

See Reich, supra note 64, at S1.

